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Book Note
MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE'S VIEW, by
Stephen Breyer'
CHANAKYA SETH I
IN SHAKESPEARE'S HENRYIV Hotspur listens as Owen Glendower boasts, "I
can call spirits from the vasty deep." Unimpressed, he replies, "Why, so can I,
or. so can any man, but will they come when you do call for them? 2 This simple
yet weighty question frames and unites the discussion that is central to Justice
Stephen Breyer's new book.
Making Our Democracy Work is the second work in recent years by.Breyer,
one of four members of the US Supreme Court's more liberal wing. Here, his
focus is on explaining and defending "the democratic anomaly" that is judicial
review.' Why do the other branches of government accept the Court's
interpretation of the law as final? Why does the public? Will they accept even
those decisions that they believe are wrong and unpopular? "Many of us take for
granted that the answer to these questions is yes," Breyer notes, "but this was not
always the case."s
Breyer's answer to these existential questions is part history lesson and part
theoretical exposition, though, unlike his Originalist colleagues, he eschews any
grand theory of interpretation. Instead, Breyer's focus throughout the work is on
developing "workable" and "pragmatic" answers that are sensitive to evolving
societal needs,' often via the multi-factored analyses for which he is famous.
1. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010) 270 pages.
2. As cited in ibid. at 11.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid at 3.
5. Ibid. at xii.
6. Ibid. at xi-xiv.
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In part I, Breyer surveys the mixed history of American fidelity to judicial
supremacy from the deft logical acrobatics of Marbury v. Madison to the tragedy
of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia to the triumph of the rule of law in Brown v. Board
ofEducation.' The book is at its liveliest here thanks to Breyer's focus on the oft-
neglected stories of the human beings behind these seminal cases-on lives
destroyed and lives defended. His point, though, is simple: public trust in the
Court is not axiomatic; it must be learned by each generation anew. On this front,
Breyer evinces concern for the future of the Court's democratic legitimacy, noting
that only one-third of all Americans can name the three branches of government,
though two-thirds can name a judge on American Idol.'
Part 1I attempts to suggest some of the ways in which the Court can help earn
its rightfil place in the American system of government. Breyer points to traditional
interpretative tools, including text, history, tradition, and precedent, but he places
special emphasis on having regard for "purposes and related consequences."'
Such an approach, in Breyer's view, firmly rejects the "dead hand" of Originalism
and is sensitive to the need to defer to the other branches of government where
appropriate. The moving narratives of the first part are replaced here with
somewhat dryer treatments of technical concepts, such as decentralization,
subsidiarity, and stare decisis, each of which is nonetheless described lucidly.
In part III, Breyer seeks to illustrate how he would put his approach to work
in contemporary contexts. While stressing the importance of eschewing absolutist
interpretations of constitutional rights in favour of contextual balancing, he
concedes that any such proportionality analysis-which is, of course, anathema
to Originalists-is "complex and difficult."'" Breyer reasons, however, that there is
no alternative if the Court is to produce answers that resonate with modern societal
values. Finally, Breyer points to the recent quartet of Guantanamo Bay cases (where
he notes he was in the majority) as typifying the Court's ability to craft pragmatic,
workable solutions that other branches and the public find "natural and
appropriate to abide by.""
7. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing the principle of judicial
review); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831) (declining to recognize the autonomy
of Indian tribes); and Brown v. Board ofEducation of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overturning
the doctrine of "separate but equal," which permitted racial segregation in public schools).
8. Supra note I at 219.
9. Ibid. at 74.
10. Ibid. at 170.
11. Ibid. at 214.
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This is a highly unusual book. Breyer is the only sitting justice among the
Court's liberals to have published a book-length work articulating an alternative
theory of constitutional interpretation. Those who desire a bolder rebuttal to the
seductive elegance of Originalism may be left hungry for more. Nevertheless, at
a time when legal thinkers on the left are struggling to articulate an interpretive
approach with sufficient vigour to match those on the right, Making Our
Democracy Work serves as a welcome and effective counterpoise.

